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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030454-CA
v.
KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional plea to damaging a jail, a third degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Can a police car in which an arrestee is being detained be an "other
place of confinement" within the damaging a jail statute?
A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness. State ex rel. P.S., 2001 UT App 305, Tf 10, 38 P.3d 303.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes, cited in this brief, are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-8-418 (1999) (the "damaging a jail statute");
§ 62A-7-201 (Supp. 2003);
§ 64-13-14.5 (2000);
§ 76-5-101 (2003);
§ 76-8-309 (2003).
§ 78-3 A-114 (Supp. 2003).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On January 31, 2002, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol (R. 1-3). Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the arresting
officer's vehicle (R. 3). Defendant then became angry and kicked out the back window
of the police vehicle (R. 3, 117).
On February 1, 2002, defendant was charged with damaging a jail, a third degree
felony, and with driving under the influence of alcohol, interference with an arresting
officer, driving without insurance, and disorderly conduct, all class B misdemeanors (R.
1-3). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all but the last charge (R.
38-39,40).
On June 21, 2002, defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover on the damaging
a jail charge, asserting that a police car is not a "place of confinement" under the
applicable statute (R. 49-55). After a hearing on July 18, 2002, the trial court denied
defendant's motion (R. 99-100, 128).
On March 6, 2003, defendant entered into a plea agreement in which he reserved
the right to appeal the trial court's ruling (R. 116-120). Pursuant to that agreement,
defendant pleaded guilty to damaging a jail in return for the State's dismissing the

because defendant pleaded guilty to the crime and defendant did not include a
preliminary hearing or plea hearing transcript in the record on appeal, the facts of the
crime are taken from the probable cause statement in the charging information and from
defendant's statement in support of the plea.
2

remaining counts (R. 118). Defendant was subsequently given a suspended sentence of
zero-to-five years in prison, a fine, and thirty-six months probation (R. 131-33).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 134).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss
because, as a matter of law, a police vehicle is not an "other place of confinement" under
the damaging a jail statute. Because defendant's three-page argument includes only
random citation to legal authority with no analysis as to how it supports his claim, this
Court should reject it as inadequately briefed.
In any case, defendant's claim fails under traditional rules of statutory
construction. First, the plain meaning of "other place of confinement" is broad enough to
include a police vehicle in which an arrestee is being detained. Second, an interpretation
of "other place of confinement" to include places where arrestees may be detained is
consistent with the policy underlying the statute, which is to protect public places in
which persons are being restrained for law enforcement purposes. Third, the legislature
has shown itself capable of limiting the reach of statutes to penal institutions when it
wants to, and its decision not to do so here must be given force.

3

ARGUMENT
A POLICE CAR IN WHICH AN ARRESTEE IS BEING
DETAINED IS AN "OTHER PLACE OF CONFINEMENT"
WITHIN THE DAMAGING A JAIL STATUTE
Defendant claims that the trial court should have dismissed the damaging a jail
charge because, as a matter of law, a police car is not an "other place of confinement"
under the applicable statute. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8. This Court should reject defendant's
claim either as inadequately briefed or as contrary to the plain language of the statute
under which defendant was charged.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 ("the damaging a jail statute") provides: "A person
who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise
damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third
degree." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1999) (emphasis added).
A.

Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed where he fails to
identify or apply the relevant rules of statutory construction and
fails to explain how the legal authority he cites supports his
claim.

Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's
brief "shall contain .. . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v.
Gomez, 2002 UT 120, f 20, 63 P.3d 72 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));

4

see also State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 67, 57 P.3d 977 (rejecting inadequately briefed
claim in death penalty case), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863 (2002); State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99, % 46 n.5, 37 P.3d 1073. "Implicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham,
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989).
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the
reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 12, 69
P.3d 1278. Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the court
will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, \ 12, 52 P.3d 467.
This Court simply "will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth' on
behalf of defendants." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (citation
omitted). In fact, "Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed
arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v.
Norris, 2001 UT 104, ^ 28, 48 P.3d 872; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ 13, 72 P.3d
138.
Here, defendant challenges the trial court's interpretation of the phrase, "other
place of confinement," within the damaging a jail statute. However, nowhere in his
brief does defendant set forth the traditional rules of statutory construction used to
interpret statutory language or apply those rules to the damaging a jail statute. See Aplt.

5

Br. at 6-9 (referencing doctrine of ejusdem generis only in noting that this Court refused
to apply it to the damaging a jail statute).
Moreover, although defendant cites to three published opinions addressing the
statute, he fails to explain how those opinions or their holdings relate in any way to his
claim. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8 (citing State v. Perez, 2000 UT App 65, 999 P.3d 579; State
v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App.
1991)).
Defendant's argument, therefore, is nothing more that "bald citation to authority"
with no "development of that authority" or "reasoned analysis based on that authority."
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. As a consequence, defendant's argument impermissibly
'"dump[s] the burden of argument and research'" onto this Court. Gomez, 2002 UT 120,
Tf 20 (citation omitted). Because defendant's claim is inadequately briefed, this Court
should refuse to reach it.
B.

The plain meaning of the phase "other place of confinement'' is
broad enough to include a police car in which an arrestee is
being detained.

Should this Court excuse defendant's failure to adequately brief his claim, the
claim nevertheless fails as a matter of statutory construction.
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25, 4 P.3d 795; see also Brixen &
Christopher Architects, P.C v. State, 2001 UT App 210, \ 14, 29 P.3d 650. "[Statutory
6

term[s] should be interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted meaning,
where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is neither
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of
the statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^ 9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations omitted).
In addition, "[t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole.'" State v.
Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, If 16, 21 P.3d 249 (quoting Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, If 17,
5 P.3d 616). Thus, this Court "interprets] the provisions 'in harmony with other
provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related
chapters." Brixen & Christopher Architects, B.C., 2001 UT App 210, ^[ 15 (quoting Lyon,
2000 UT 19, f 17 (additional citation omitted)).
In this case, defendant claims "other place of confinement" within the damaging a
jail statute must be interpreted as limited to "a jail, prison or other penal institution" in
which "an accused person is committed as an inmate." Aplt. Br. at 7, 8. According to his
argument below, "places of confinement" should be limited to facilities in which
defendants have been placed "after sentence . . . as opposed to a police car when a
person's first arrested" (R. 138:6).
However, nothing in the plain language of the statute even references inmates, let
alone limits "other place of confinement" to "secure confinement locations, jails, prisons,
and things of that nature, where a person can be sentenced to as a result of court action"
(R. 138:6). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418. Moreover, such an interpretation is
inconsistent with the traditional rules of statutory construction set forth above.
7

First, the plain meaning of "place" includes "[a]n area with definite or indefinite
boundaries; a portion of space" and "[a] building or an area set aside for a specified
purpose." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), at
http://www.bartlebv.com/61/23/P0342300.html (last visited 3/22/04); see also MerriamWebster Online Dictionary, at http://www.m"W.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book:^Dictionary
&va=place (last visited 3/22/04) (defining "place" to include "physical environment," "an
indefinite region or expanse," and "a building or locality used for a special purpose").
The plain meaning of "confinement" is "[t]he act of confining or the state of being
confined." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), at
http://www.bartlebv.com/61/18/C0561800.html (last visited 3/23/04); see also MerriamWebster Online Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi~bin/dictionary7book
^Dictionarv&va^confmement (last visited 3/22/04).
The plain meaning of confine is "[t]o keep within bounds; restrict" or "[t]o shut or
keep in, especially to imprison." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (4th ed. 2000), at http://www.bartlebv.com/61/17/C0561700.html (last visited
3/23/04); see also Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=confine (last visited 3/22/04) (defining "confine" to
include "something (as borders or walls) that encloses" and "something that restrains").
Thus, the plain meaning of "other place of confinement" is an other bounded area
that shuts in or restricts. The back seat of a police car being used to transport an arrestee
certainly falls within that plain meaning. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 577 S.E.2d 839,
8

841 (Ga. App. 2003) (describing defendant, after being arrested and placed in police car,
as person "who was confined in the police car"); Mar ley v. Huron Valley Men's Facility
Warden, 418 N.W.2d 430, 434 (Mich. App. 1987) (recognizing that van transporting
prisoners to court could be "a place of confinement"); State v. Torgrimson, 637 N.W.2d
345, 350 (Minn. App. 2002) (noting, in discussing Fourth Amendment application to
police car, that "in some instances, the back seat of the vehicle can act as the equivalent
of a temporary jail cell"). Cf. Noguchi v. Nakamura, 638 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Haw. App.
1982) (per curiam) ("Obviously, [an] automobile . . . can be a place of confinement" for
purposes of false imprisonment); People v. Jackson, 666 N.E.2d 854, 862 (111. App. 1996)
(noting "confinement usually means enclosure or confinement within something such as a
house or car"); State v. White, 492 S.E.2d 48, 51 (N.C. App. 1997) (recognizing car as
"place of confinement" for purposes of kidnapping).2
Second, this broad reading of "other place of confinement" is consistent with the
language used in the related juvenile statute. Section 62A-7-201(7) provides:
2

Although defendant cites to Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1990)
("Clark F), withdrawn on rehryg, 963 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1992) ("ClarkIF), as
"opin[ing] that an arrest and detention in a parole office did not constitute confinement,"
Aplt. Br. at 8, the issue in that case was whether the petitioner's allegations of
mistreatment during those events constituted challenges to "conditions of confinement."
See Clark I, 914 F.2d at 1429. In Clark I, the court held that "conditions of confinement"
generally only include "'ongoing prison practices and regulations,'" and thus did not
include the isolated incidents alleged by the petitioner. See id.
In Clark II, the court withdrew its prior opinion, held that "conditions of
confinement" included isolated incidents of mistreatment, and concluded that because the
petitioner was in confinement during the pretrial detention incident, it did not have to
decide whether the petitioner was also in confinement while he was being held at the
parole office after his arrest. ClarkII, 963 F.2d at 1364-65.
9

A child who willfully and intentionally damages a jail or other place
of confinement as provided in Section 76-8-418, including a
detention, shelter, or secure confinement facility [] operated by the
Division of Juvenile Justice Services, commits an act which would
be a third degree felony if committed by an adult.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(7) (Supp. 2003); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-3A-114
(Supp. 2003). The clear import of the "including" language is that the locations listed do
not represent an exhaustive list of what constitutes an "other place of confinement." See,
e.g., State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah 1983) (discussing predecessor to evidence
rule 404(b) and noting that "the word 'including,' which precedes the list of exceptions
. . . 'indicates that the list is illustrative, not exhaustive.5") (quoting State v. Forsyth, 741
P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982)). Where the list sets forth essentially all "penal institutions"
applicable to juveniles, "other place of confinement" must include places other than such
penal institutions.
Moreover, such interpretation is consistent with the public policy evidenced by the
plain language of the statute and its placement in Title 76, Part 4, "Offenses against
Public Property." Both demonstrate that the statute was designed to protect public places
in which persons would be restrained for law enforcement purposes. See, e.g.,
Sorenson 's Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, f 12, 36 P.3d 528 (noting court
can consider "relevant policy considerations" if it finds statutory language ambiguous)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, when the legislature seeks to limit the term "confinement" to reach only
penal institutions or places of confinement of "inmates," it knows how to do that. See,
10

e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7)(b) (2003) ("confinement in a state prison, jail,
institution for confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order
of the court or sentenced and committed"); Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-14.5(1) (2000)
("place of confinement of an inmate") (emphasis added); Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-101
(2003) (defining "prisoner" to include "any person who is in custody of a peace officer
pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other penal institution")
(emphasis added); cf. State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 641 (Utah 1997) (lead opinion of
Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (noting that when legislature intends criminal statutes
to be "tailored to apply only within the confines of prison," it uses language like crimes
"'committed by a person who is confined in jail or other correctional institution5"
(citations omitted)).
The legislature's omission of such limiting language in the damaging a jail statute
"should 'be taken note of and given effect.5" Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999
UT 110, f 14, 993 P.2d 875 (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d
102, 514 P.2d 217, 219 (1973)); see also State ex rel A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah
App. 1997) (giving force to legislature's failure to include rehabilitation as factor for
consideration under serious youth offender act where legislature's inclusion of
rehabilitation as factor under other statutes indicated legislature knew how to include
such factor when it wanted); State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App. 1991)
(Orme, J., concurring in result) (discussing statute defining when state may appeal in
criminal cases).
11

None of Utah's damaging a jail cases conflict with this result. See State v. Perez,
2000 UT App 65, 999 P.3d 579; State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993); State
v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1991)). First, all three of those cases involved
damage to an actual jail facility. See Perez, 2000 UT App 65, ^ 2 ("Defendant was
arrested and booked into the Utah County Jail."); Pharris, 846 P.2d at 457 ("Defendant
was an inmate in the San Juan County Jail. . . ."); Jaimez, 817 P.2d at 823 (noting crime
occurred at Carbon County jail). Thus, none involved interpretation of the phrase,
"other place of confinement," within the damaging a jail statute.
Second, nothing in those cases mandates a limited interpretation of "other place of
confinement." Although defendant cites to Jaimez for the proposition that "[j]ails,
prisons and the like are intended to be places of confinement once an accused person is
committed as an inmate," Aplt. Br. at 8 (citing 'Jaimez at 883"), the pin cite he provides
does not fall within the Jaimez opinion. In the event defendant intended to cite to page
823 of the opinion, he cites only to the factual background provided by the court, which
indicates that the people involved in that incident were "inmates then incarcerated in a
common area." Jaimez, 817 P.2d at 823.
The issue in Jaimez was whether the squad room was part of a jail for purposes of
the statute. This Court held that it was because, "while the squad room was at times
used for purposes other than confining inmates, it was also used for jail purposes,"
where "one of the major uses of the squad room was to house inmates and to process
them." 817 P.2d at 827; see also id. ("Because one of the major uses of the squad room
12

was to house inmates . . . 5 we find no error in the court's conclusion that the squad room
was part of the jail as that term is used in the statute.").3 Nowhere in the Court's decision
did it discuss the phrase "other place of confinement" within the statute, let alone limit
such places to those that house inmates. Nor does any language within the statute do so.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418.
Thus, considering the public policy reasons behind the statute, see supra at p. 10,
Jaimez can easily be interpreted as supporting the conclusion that just because a police
vehicle is "at times used for purposes other than confining" arrestees, that fact alone
does not remove the police car from the reaches of the damaging a jail statute. Indeed,
defendant's own argument below—during which he recognized that even a private
home can be a "place of confinement" under certain conditions (R. 138:6)—supports
this conclusion.
In Pharris, this Court held that defendant's acts of "breaking the cell bunk weld
and damaging the power generator by flooding the jail c e l l . . . fall within the scope of the
statute because they caused injury to portions of the jail facility that are essential to its
functioning." 846 P.2d at 466. As in Jaimez, nowhere did the Court discuss the phrase
"other place of confinement" within the statute, let alone limit such places to those that
house inmates.

3

The Court also held that "any damage to the facility amounted to an injury"
under the statute. Id.
13

In Perez, this Court considered whether scratching an obscenity into a cell door
constituted damaging a jail. 2000 UT App 65, f 5. This Court concluded that the statute
"encompasses any damage to a jail," clarifying that, despite language in Pharris
suggesting otherwise, the damage "need not impair the functioning of the jail." Id. at
\ 10. The court also rejected the defendant's suggestion that "the damage inflicted be of
the same magnitude as those types of damage enumerated in the statute," holding that
the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not apply where the term "damages" is neither
ambiguous nor unconstitutionally vague. Id. at €[flj 11-12. Again, nothing in the opinion
addressed the phrase "other place of confinement" within the statute, let alone limited
such places to those that house inmates.
Because a police vehicle restricting an arrestee is a place of confinement under
the damaging a jail statute, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss,
and defendant's appeal fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

f April 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KARENA.KLUCZMIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

Addendum A

76-8-418. Damaging jails.
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys,
floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of confinement is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.

62A-7-201. Confinement — Facilities — Restrictions [Effective July 1, 2004].
(1) Children under 18 years of age, who are apprehended by any officer or
brought before any court for examination under any provision of state law, may
not be confined in jails, lockups, or cells used for ordinary criminals or persons
charged with crime, or in secure postadjudication correctional facilities operated by the division, except as provided by specific statute and in conformance
with approved standards.
(2) (a) Children charged by information or indictment with crimes as a
serious youth offender under Section 78-3a-602 or certified to stand trial
as an adult pursuant to Section 78-3a-603 may be detained in a jail or
other place of detention used for adults.
(b) Children detained in adult facilities under Section 78-3a-602 or
78-3a-603 prior to a hearing before a magistrate, or under Subsection
78-3a-114(3), may only be held in certified juvenile detention accommodations in accordance with rules promulgated by the division. Those rules
shall include standards for acceptable sight and sound separation from
adult inmates. The division certifies facilities that are in compliance with
the division's standards.
(3) In areas of low density population, the division may, by rule, approve
juvenile holding accommodations within adult facilities that have acceptable
sight and sound separation. Those facilities shall be used only for short-term
holding purposes, with a maximum confinement of six hours, for children
alleged to have committed an act which would be a criminal oflFense if
committed by an adult. Acceptable short-term holding purposes are: identification, notification of juvenile court officials, processing, and allowance of
adequate time for evaluation of needs and circumstances regarding release or
transfer to a shelter or detention facility.
(4) Children who are alleged to have committed an act which would be a
criminal offense if committed by an adult, may be detained in holding rooms in
local law enforcement agency facilities for a maximum of two hours, for
identification or interrogation, or while awaiting release to a parent or other
responsible adult. Those rooms shall be certified by the division, according to
the division's rules. Those rules shall include provisions for constant supervision and for sight and sound separation from adult inmates.
(5) Willful failure to comply with any of the provisions of this section is a
class B misdemeanor.
(6) The division is responsible for the custody and detention of children
under 18 years of age who require detention care prior to trial or examination,
or while awaiting assignment to a home or facility, as a dispositional placement
under Subsection 78-3a-118(2)(f)(i) or 78-3a-901(3)(a), and of youth offenders
under Subsection 62A-7-112(8). The division shall provide standards for
custody or detention under Subsections (2)(b), (3), and (4), and shall determine
and set standards for conditions of care and confinement of children in
detention facilities. All other custody or detention shall be provided by the
division, or by contract with a public or private agency willing to undertake
temporary custody or detention upon agreed terms, or in suitable premises
distinct and separate from the general jails, lockups, or cells used in law
enforcement and corrections systems.
(7) A child who willfully and intentionally damages a jail or other place of
confinement as provided in Section 76-8-418, including a detention, shelter, or
secure confinement facility, operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice
Services, commits an act which would be a third degree felony if committed by
an adult.

64-13-14.5. Limits of confinement place — Release status
— Work release.
(1) The department may extend the limits of the place of confinement of an
inmate when, as established by department policies and procedures, there is
cause to believe the inmate will honor his trust, by authorizing him under
prescribed conditions:
(a) to leave temporarily for purposes specified by department policies
and procedures to visit specifically designated places for a period not to
exceed 30 days;
(b) to participate in a voluntary training program in the community
while housed at a correctional facility or to work at paid employment;
(c) to be housed in a nonsecure community correctional center operated
by the department; or
(d) to be housed in any other facility under contract with the department.
(2) The department shall establish rules governing offenders on release
status. A copy of the rules shall be furnished to the offender and to any
employer or other person participating in the offender's release program. Any
employer or other participating person shall agree in writing to abide by the
rules and to notify the department of the offender's discharge or other release
from a release program activity, or of any violation of the rules governing
release status.
(3) The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of
his confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an institutioii or
facility designated by the department is an escape from custody.
(4) If an offender is arrested for the commission of a crime, the arresting
authority shall immediately notify the department of the arrest.
(5) The department may impose appropriate sanctions upon offenders who
violate rules, including prosecution for escape under Section 76-8-309 and for
unauthorized absence.
(6) An inmate who is housed at a nonsecure correctional facility and on work
release may not be required to work for less than the current federally
established minimum wage, or under substandard working conditions^

76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined [Effective until July 1, 2004].
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of
a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other
penal institution or a facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles
operated by the Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the
confinement is legal.

"Prisoner" defined [Effective July 1, 2004].
For purposes of tliis part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of
a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other
penal institution or a facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles
operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regardless of whether the
confinement is legal.

76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape — Consecutive
sentences — Definitions.
(1) (a) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without
lawful authorization.
(b) If a prisoner obtains authorization to leave official custody by means
of deceit, fraud, or other artifice, the prisoner has not received lawful
authorization.
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an
escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or causes
serious bodily injury to another.
(3) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony.
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony.
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony.
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section
shall run consecutively with any other sentence.
(7) For the purposes of this part:
(a) "Confinement" means the prisoner is:
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a
contract with the Utah Department of Corrections after being sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or
voided or the prisoner is not on parole;
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or sentencing or
housed in a county jail after sentencing and commitment and the
sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on
parole; or
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest.
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or
confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure confinement of
juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or
voided or the prisoner is not on parole. A person is considered confined in
the state prison if he:
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from
work release or home visit by the time designated for return;
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation;
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment,
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by
correctional officers.
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and includes
persons under trustee status.

78-3a-114. Placement of minor in detention or shelter
facility — Grounds — Detention hearings — Period of detention — Notice — Confinement of
minors for criminal proceedings — Bail laws
inapplicable, exception [Effective July 1, 2004].
(1) (a) A minor may not be placed or kept in a secure detention facilitypending court proceedings unless it is unsafe for the public to leave the
minor with his parents, guardian, or custodian and the minor is
detainable based on guidelines promulgated by the Division of Juvenile
Justice Services.
(b) A minor who must be taken from his home but who does not require
physical restriction shall be given temporary care in a shelter facility and
may not be placed in a detention facility
(c) A minor may not be placed or kept in a shelter facility pending court
proceedings unless it is unsafe for the minor to leave him with his parents,
guardian, or custodian.
(2) After admission to a detention facility pursuant to the guidelines
established by the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and immediate
investigation by an authorized officer of the court, the Judge or the officer shall
order the release of the minor to his parents, guardian, or custodian if it is
found he can be safely returned to their care, either upon written promise to
bring the minor to the court at a time set or without restriction.
(a) If the minor's parent, guardian, or custodian fails to retrieve the
minor from a facility within 24 hours after notification of release, the
parent, guardian, or custodian is responsible for the cost of care for the
time the minor remains in the facility.
(b) The facility shall determine the cost of care.
(c) Any money collected under this Subsection (2) shall be retained by
the Division of Juvenile Justice Services to recover the cost of care for the
time the minor remains in the facility
(3) (a) When a minor is detained in a detention or shelter facility, the
parents or guardian shall be informed by the person in charge of the
facility that they have the right to a prompt hearing in court to determine
whether the minor is to be further detained or released.
(b) Detention hearings shall be held by the judge or by a commissioner.
(c) The court may, at any time, order the release of the minor, whether
a detention hearing is held or not.
(d) If the minor is released, and the minor remains in the facility,
because the parents, guardian, or custodian fails to retrieve the minor, the
parents, guardian, or custodian shall be responsible for the cost of care as
provided in Subsections (2)(a), (b), and (c).
(4) (a) A minor may not be held in a detention facility longer than 48 hours
prior to a detention hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless the
court has entered an order for continued detention.
(b) A minor may not be held in a shelter facility longer than 48 hours
prior to a shelter hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless a court
order for extended shelter has been entered by the court after notice to all
parties described in Section 78-3a-306.
(c) A hearing for detention or shelter may not be waived. Detention staff
shall provide the court with all information received from the person who
brought the minor to the detention facility.
(d) If the court finds at a detention hearing that it is not safe to release
the minor, the judge or commissioner may order the minor to be held in the

facility or be placed in another appropriate facility, subject to further order
of the court,
(e) (i) After a detention hearing has been held, only the court may
release a minor from detention. If a minor remains in a detention
facility, periodic reviews shall be held pursuant to the Utah State
Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure to ensure that
continued detention is necessary.
(ii) If the court orders home detention, it shall direct that notice of
its order be provided to designated persons in the appropriate local
law enforcement agency and the school or transferee school, if
applicable, which the minor attends. The designated persons may
receive the information for purposes of the minor's supervision and
student safety.
(iii) Any employee of the local law enforcement agency and the
school which the minor attends who discloses the court's order of
probation is not:
(A) civilly liable except when the disclosure constitutes fraud
or malice as provided in Section 63-30-4; and
(B) civilly or criminally liable except when disclosure constitutes a knowing violation of Section 63-2-801.
(5) A minor may not be held in a detention facility, following a dispositional
order of the court for nonsecure substitute care as defined in Section 62A-4a101, or for community-based placement under Section 62A-7-101 for longer
than 72 hours, excluding weekends and holidays. The period of detention may
be extended by the court for one period of seven calendar days if:
(a) the Division of Juvenile Justice Services or another agency responsible for placement files a written petition with the court requesting the
extension and setting forth good cause; and
(b) the court enters a written finding that it is in the best interests of
both the minor and the community to extend the period of detention.
(6) The agency requesting an extension shall promptly notify the detention
facility that a written petition has been filed.
(7) The court shall promptly notify the detention facility regarding its initial
disposition and any ruling on a petition for an extension, whether granted or
denied.
(8) (a) A minor under 16 years of age may not be held in a jail, lockup, or
other place for adult detention except as provided by Section 62A-7-201 or
unless certified as an adult pursuant to Section 78-3a-603. The provisions
of Section 62A-7-201 regarding confinement facilities apply to this Subsection (8).
(b) A minor 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition
endangers the safety or welfare of others in the detention facility for
minors may, by court order that specifies the reasons, be detained in
another place of confinement considered appropriate by the court, including a jail or other place of confinement for adults. However, a secure youth
corrections facility is not an appropriate place of confinement for detention
purposes under this section.
(9) A sheriff, warden, or other official in charge of a jail or other facility for
the detention of adult offenders or persons charged with crime shall immediately notify the juvenile court when a minor who is or appears to be under 18
years of age is received at the facility and shall make arrangements for the
transfer of the minor to a detention facility, unless otherwise ordered by the
juvenile court.

(10) This section does not apply to a minor who is brought to the adult
facility under charges pursuant to Section 78-3a-602 or by order of the juvenile
court to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court under Section
78-3a-603.
(11) A minor held for criminal proceedings under Section 78-3a-602 or
78-3a-603 may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults
charged with crime.
(12) Provisions of law regarding bail are not applicable to minors detained
or taken into custody under this chapter, except that bail may be allowed:
(a) if a minor who need not be detained lives outside this state; or
(b) when a minor who need not be detained comes within one of the
classes in Subsection 78-3a-503(ll).
(13) Section 76-8-418 is applicable to a minor who willfully and intentionally commits an act against a jail or other place of confinement, including a
Division of Juvenile Justice Services detention, shelter, or secure confinement
facility which would be a third degree felony if committed by an adult.

